PRUDENCE OR PARANOIA: CONSIDERING
STRICTER REGULATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKET
I. INTRODUCTION

Recent reports of companies and municipalities losing millions of
dollars from investments in over-the-counter (OTC) financial
derivatives' have prompted foreboding headlines about derivatives,2
encouraged increased scrutiny of their use,3 and polarized opinions
toward these misunderstood financial instruments.4 While OTC and
1. In April 1994, Procter & Gamble announced a $157 million derivatives loss which was
taken as a pre-tax charge. Paulette Thomas, Procter& Gamble Sues Bankers Trust Because of
Huge Losses on Derivatives,WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at A6. Metallgesellschaft, Germany's
fourteenth largest industrial corporation, lost $1.45 billion speculating in oil-based derivatives.
Michael R. Sesit, Bulls on MetallgeselischaftSay German Firm, Hurt by TradingLosses, Could
Stage Rebound, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1994, at C2. In December 1994, Orange County,
California declared bankruptcy after losing approximately $1.5 billion from derivatives products.
Bitter FruitOrange County, Mired In Investment Mess, Filesfor Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Dec.
7, 1994, at Al. Barings, a venerable British bank, was recently sunk by a "rogue trader" who
lost about $900 million using derivatives instruments. The Bank that Disappeared,ECONOMIST,
Mar. 4, 1995, at 11.
2. See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, Just When You Thought It Was Safe... ; Derivatives
Presenta New Risk, Even If You Think You're Not Involved, CHI. TRB., Apr. 25,1994, at Cl;
Ruth Simon, Don't Get Socked by These #?@1* Derivatives, MONEY, Aug. 1994, at 26; Jim
Gallagher, It's a Bet" No Getting Around Derivatives' High Risk, ST. Louis POST, May 26,1994,
at 1C; First Boston Derivatives Loss Tip of Iceberg? Firm's $40-Million Deficit Could Be
Repeated by Any Asset Manager, Analysts Warn, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1994, at D3; Kathy
Kristof, Are You at Risk? Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Derivatives,but Were
Afraid to Ask, CHI. TRin., Aug. 9, 1994, at C9.
3.12
3. See, eg., Steve Cocheo, Derivatives Under Scrutiny, ABA BANKING J., Dec. 1993, at 35,
35; Steven M. Roberts, High-Profile Fiascos with Derivatives Point Up the Need for More
Vigilance, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1994, at 16; Richard C. Breeden, Directors, Control Your
Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at A14.
4. See Albert R. Karr & Steven Lipin, Two Federal Reserve System Officials Voice
Differing Views on Derivatives,WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1994, at A5 (noting that Susan Phillips, a
Federal Reserve Board governor, is vigorously in favor of derivatives use and feels that risk
management practices in the financial world are positively affected by the scrutiny given
derivatives, while William McDonough, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
is seriously concerned about systemic risks attendant to the growing derivatives market).
CompareJack Egan, Worry over Weird Investments, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 31,1994,
at 66 (stating that derivatives and their risks are not yet completely understood and "the more
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exchange-traded derivatives have many features in common, most of
the debate concerning derivatives and most of the recent losses in
derivatives activities have been related to OTC contracts.' The
spectacular growth of the OTC financial derivatives market in the past
few years,6 evidenced by figures measuring principal amounts of
outstanding derivatives in the trillions of U.S. dollars,7 has added to
the debate. There is a growing fear that the global linkages common
to derivatives could contribute to a worldwide failure of financial
markets! In response, legislators and regulatory agencies worldwide
have formulated various proposals aimed at controlling OTC
derivatives activity.'
The cry for regulatory change has been especially pronounced in
the United States, where the majority of OTC derivatives transactions
are based.'0 A recent report by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) concluded that sweeping regulatory changes are needed to

worries, reports and disclosures the better") with Saul Hansell, Derivatives as the Fall Guy:
Excuses, Excuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, § 3, at 1 (asserting that derivatives are "efficient
tools that lend greater stability to business operations") and Thomas C. Theobald, Derivatives
Aren't the Danger,WALL ST. J., May 23,1994, at A14 (stating that Congress should not regulate
derivatives merely to insulate those few firms who make risk management mistakes).
5. Cocheo, supra note 3, at 35.
6. One source suggests that the derivatives market increased eight-fold in the five years
prior to 1992. Saul Hansell & Kevin Muehring, Why Derivatives Rattle the Regulators,
INSTITUTIONAL INvESToR, Sept. 1992, at 49,49. In its recent report, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) estimates that the notional amounts of derivatives outstanding increased 145%
from the end of fiscal year 1989 to the end of fiscal year 1992. UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 34-35 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
7. The GAO report estimated the global notional amount of derivatives outstanding at the
end of fiscal 1992 was at least $12.1 trillion. GAO REPORT, supranote 6, at 34.
8. See Carol J. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7,1994, at 40,41;
MICHAEL R. DARBY, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES AND SYSTEMIC RISK TO THE

GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 8 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
4801,1994).
9. See, eg., GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 14-16; OTC DERIVATIVE OVERSiOHr.
STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION AND THE SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT BOARD, March 15, 1994,

reprintedin Daniel P. Cunningham et a., An Introductionto OTC Derivatives,in SWAPS AND
OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1994, at 297-306 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Handbook Series No.
B-848, 1994); Baie Netzer, Are Derivatives a Blessing or a Burden? Regulators Want to Know
More,INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 4,1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Libary, IHT file (predicting
that the proposed legislation by Representatives Edward J.Markey, Henry B. Gonzalez, and
James A. Leach is unlikely to be enacted this year but will probably be reintroduced before
Congress in 1995).
10. As of December 1991, eight U.S. bank dealers accounted for 56% of the worldwide
notional amount of interest rate and currency swaps. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
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guard against the potential dangers posed by OTC derivatives."
Other commentators have downplayed the risks of derivatives,
suggesting that the current regulation of derivatives is sufficient. 2

Because the United States is the world leader in derivatives,1 3 other
countries with large derivatives markets are following American
events carefully. Any change in the United States' regulation of OTC
derivatives will have a profound impact on the regulation of derivatives worldwide.
Those caught between adamant critics and vigorous proponents
of additional derivatives regulation are left with many questions:
What are derivatives and how are they different from other financial
instruments? Are the risks of OTC derivatives different from the

risks of exchange-traded derivatives?

Do derivatives substantially

increase the likelihood of a system-wide financial crisis? Can
derivatives be sufficiently controlled through existing regulatory

frameworks? What would be the consequences of over-regulating
derivatives? Focusing on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, this
Note addresses these questions and, using the U.S. derivatives market
as an example, examines whether more regulation of these instruments is necessary. Part II explains what derivative instruments are
and how they work. Part H analyzes recent regulatory proposals and
examines the current regulation of the U.S. derivatives markets. Part
IV examines the debate concerning additional derivatives regulation

and outlines the most appropriate regulatory action. Part V concludes
that the fears of system-wide financial disruption are overblown and
do not justify additional regulation of the OTC derivatives market.
II. DERIVATIVES BASICS
A. Derivatives Defined
A derivative instrument is a financial contract whose value is
based on, or derived from, the level of some agreed-upon benchmark.'4 The value of derivatives can be based on stocks, bonds,
11. Id. at 14-15.
12. Se e.g., LaWare Reiterates Stand on Derivatives Rules, AM. BANKER, Dec. 8,1994, at
22.
13. See Loomis, supranote 8, at 41.
14. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3; Peter A. Abken, Over-the-Counter Financial
Derivatives:Risky Business?,FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1994,
at 1, 2; Loomis, supra note 8, at 40; Lee Berton, Experts Shed Light on the Murky and Complex
World of Derivatives,WALL ST. J. EUR., June 16,1994, availablein WESTLAW, WSJ-EURO
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commodities, currencies, government or corporate debt, home
mortgages, interest rates, exchange rates, indexes that reflect the value
of some bundle of financial products, or any combination of these.15
The rate, index, or price upon which the derivative's value is based is
known as the "underlying."16 Changes
in the value of the underlying
17
affect the value of the derivative.
The following example illustrates the basic mechanics of a
derivative. An investor purchases an option which gives him the
right, but not the obligation, to buy a particular share of stock for ten
dollars within the next thirty days.' 8 The option in this example is
a derivative-its value is based on, or derived from, the price of the
underlying stock. f4 after thirty days, the stock price drops to less
than ten dollars, the option will have a value of zero, and the investor
will have lost the amount paid for the option. The investor will not
exercise the option because the stock could be purchased for less on
the open market. IfX however, the price of the stock increases to
fifteen dollars within thirty days, the option is worth five dollars (the
amount the investor can save by exercising the option.) The investor
can realize his five dollar derivative gain.in either of two ways: he
can exercise the option, purchase the stock for ten dollars, and then
immediately sell the stock for fifteen dollars for a gain of five dollars;
or he can sell the option itself to an interested party for five dollars.19
B. Exchange-Traded and Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Derivative instruments may be traded off-the-shelf through
organized exchanges or negotiated "over-the-counter" (OTC) between
two counterparties. ° While exchange-traded and OTC derivatives

Database.
15. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 n.1; Berton, supra note 14.
16. See Terence P. Pare, Learningto Live with Derivatives,FORTUNE, July 25,1994, at 106,

107. Accordingly, the term "underlying" will be used as a noun in the remainder of this Note
in place of "underlying asset, price, rate, or index."
17. Henry T. C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of InformationalFailureand
the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE LJ.1457, 1464-65 (1993).

18. The price of an option is usually a small fraction of the underlying asset's value.
Berton, supra note 14.

19. Presumably, the person who buys the option from the investor believes it is worth five
dollars or more. If, for example, the buyer of the option believes the stock price will rise further
before the option expires, this buyer will value the option at a price greater than five dollars.
20. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
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are similar in terms of risk management,. they differ in several
important respects. First, exchange-traded derivatives are openly
arranged through organized futures or options exchanges. OTC
contracts, on the other hand, are negotiated between the two
counterparties with financial institutions acting as ,intermediaries?'
Second, exchange-traded derivatives are standardized in amount and
duration. OTC derivatives, however, are tailored to the specific needs
of the purchasers.' Third, exchange-traded derivatives are heavily
regulated by federal government agencies while OTC derivatives
remain largely unregulated.? Fourth, exchange-traded derivatives
contracts are guaranteed by the exchange or related clearing
organization.'
There is no such guarantee in OTC derivatives
transactions. As a result, OTC derivatives users scrutinize the
creditworthiness of their counterparties. 2 Because most of the
debate concerning derivatives centers on the OTC variety, this
Note focuses on the regulation of OTC derivatives.
C. Types of Derivatives
Derivatives fall into two basic categories, option-type contracts
and forward-type contracts2 9 Option-type derivatives, or "options,"
give the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the
underlying at a specified price within a certain time period. 30
Forward-type derivatives are agreements that fix prices between

21.
22.
23.
24.

Abken, supra note 14, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.

25. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DERiVATIVE PRODUCT AcInvrrES OF COMMERCIAL
BANKS, in JOINT STUDY CONDUCTED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR RIEGLE

ON DERIVAtrVE PRODUCTS 4 (Jan. 27, 1993) [hereinafter JOINT STUDY].

26. Id. at 5.
27. Cocheo, supra note 3, at 35.
28. Some commentators divide derivatives into three categories: options, forwards, and
swaps. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 6, at 4-5. But since swaps are, in effect, a series of
forward contracts, they could be classified as "forward-type" derivatives. See infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
29. See Berton, supra note 14; Loomis, supra note 8, at 43; Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational
Investments, Speculation; or Gambling?-DerivativeSecurities and FinancialFutures and Their
Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L REV. 987, 989 (1992); BASLE
COMMIrrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTs, RISK

MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES, July 27, 1994, reprinted in Fed Sec. L. Rep.

(CCH) 85,410, at [ 85,557 (Aug. 10, 1994) [hereinafter BASLE COMMITTEE].
30. See Berton, supra note 14.
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parties for some future date.3 ' Forward-type derivatives include
futures, forwards, and swaps. Futures and forwards are contracts that
obligate the holder to buy or sell a certain quantity of an underlying
at a specified price on a certain day in the future.32 Futures are
traded on organized exchanges while forwards are traded over the
counter. Swaps are OTC contracts in which counterparties agree to
make periodic payments to each other for a certain length of time.33
The amounts of the periodic payments are determined by applying
the relevant rate (such as an interest rate or a foreign exchange rate)
to some agreed upon level of hypothetical principal, called a notional
amount. 4 For example, in one of the most common swaps, an
interest-rate swap, Company A agrees to make monthly payments
based on a floating interest rate in exchange for Company B's
promise to make payments based on a fixed interest rate. The
amount upon which the interest payments are calculated (the fictional
principal) is the notional amount. 5 By entering into this contract,
Company A has effectively swapped its fixed rate interest obligation
for Company B's variable rate interest rate obligations.
The basic building blocks of derivatives are options and forwards,36 but so called "rocket scientists" in the financial world have
combined these basic products to produce more complex derivative
instruments, often called exotic derivatives.37 There are currently
hundreds of types of derivative instruments,38 many with strange,
high-tech names.39

31. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 5; Berton, supranote 14.
32. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 26.
33. Id. at 28. Each of the swap's periodic payments can be viewed as a forward contract.
The swap, then, is a series of forward contracts, with each forward contract maturing one period
after the previous contract matured. Loomis, supra note 8, at 43 ("In effect, [a swap] sets up
a series of forward contracts, each covering [a single period.]"); Abken, supra note 14, at 3
(Swaps are "sequences of forwards with successively longer maturities .... ").
34. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 28; Cocheo, supra note 3, at 35-36. For further
discussion of notional amounts, see infra notes 119-128 and accompanying text.
35. JOINT STUDY, supra note 25, at 8.
36. See DARBY, supranote 8, at 3; BAsLE COMM1TrEE, supranote 29, 85,558; Hu, supra
note 17, at 1466-67.
37. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
38. One source estimates that there are more than 1,200 different kinds of derivatives on
the market. Berton, supra note 14. But see Dean Tomasula, Software Seen Helping Manage
Exotic Swaps' Risk, AM. BANKER, Sept. 9, 1994, at 24 (estimating the number of derivatives
instruments at between 300 and 400).
39. The strange names of some derivative products are enough to worry people. Some
derivatives are named after their functions: caps, floors, collars, lookbacks, and spread locks.
Some combine the names of more basic derivatives: swaptions, captions, floortions, spreadtions,
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D. Participants in the Derivatives Markets
Those who participate in the derivatives markets are known as
end-users and dealers.' End-users include banks, securities firms,
insurance companies, governmental units, mutual and pension funds,
and commercial firms.4 ' End-users utilize derivatives to hedge risk,
to reduce the cost of financing, or to enhance returns by speculating
on the movements of the market.42 Dealers are end-users who also
buy derivatives from, and sell derivatives to, other end-users and
dealers. 3 Derivatives dealers include the largest commercial banks,
securities firms, investment banks, and insurance companies.'
E. Uses of Derivatives Products
Companies can use derivatives to control business risks associated
with the volatility of financial markets, to speculate on the direction
of market changes,' or to reduce financing costs. 4 Most companies use derivatives to control business risks by "hedging".47 Endusers hedge by purchasing derivatives whose values offset any change
in the value of the company's assets, liabilities, or required raw
materials.4 For example, a company that uses widgets as a raw
material can purchase a derivative that increases in value as widget
prices rise. The increased value of the derivative will offset the

warrants, circuses. Still others use acronyms: ELKS (equity-linked securities), YEELDS (Yieldenhanced equity-linked securities) CHIPS (common-linked higher-income participation
securities, REMICs (real estate mortgage-investment conduits). See Darby, supra note 8, at 3;
Loomis, supra note 8, at 40; Taming the Derivatives Beast, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992, at 81;
John Rothchild, How the Big Game Began, TIME, Apr. 11, 1994, at 32; George Melloan,
Whitewater, Derivatives and the Urge to Regulate,WALL ST.J.EUR., Mar. 15,1994, availablein
WESTLAW, WSJ-EURO Database.
40. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 29; Loomis, supra note 8, at 40.
41. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 29; Loomis, supra note 8, at 40-41.
42. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
43. Id.; Loomis, supra note 8, at 41.
44. Abken, supra note 14, at 4; GAO REPORT, supranote 6, at 29-30; Loomis, supra note
8, at 40.
45. In practice, it is difficult to clearly distinguish a business use of derivatives from a
speculative use. Rita Koselka, Safe When Used Properly,FORBES, Aug. 15, 1994, at 47, 4748.
46. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
47. See Vineeta Anand, ControllingRisk is Primary Task, PENSIONS & INvESTMENTS, Aug.
8,1994, at 8 (citing a survey in which three-fourths of financial executives surveyed said they use
derivatives to hedge against foreign currency and interest rate fluctuations); Berton, supranote
14; Hansell, supra note 4, at 6 ("The most common use of derivatives .. is as a form of
financial insurance.").
48. JOINT STUDY, supranote 25, at 3.
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increased widget price, thereby hedging the company against the risk
of an abrupt jump in the price of raw materials. By utilizing
derivatives a company can hedge against unfavorable turns in interest
rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices. This allows the company
49
to remain focused on its particular line of business.
Derivatives allow end-users to speculate on the movements of the
market."0 Companies can use derivatives to place bets on the
direction of prices, interest rates, or exchange rates. A speculating
company that has no particular need for a certain stock or commodity
may buy a derivative based on that stock or commodity in an attempt
to cash in on market fluctuations. For example, although a company
may not require widgets to conduct its business, it may believe widget
prices are going to rise in the near future. In an attempt to cash in
on this hunch, the company can purchase a derivative whose value is
directly related to the price of widgets. If widget prices rise, the
trader can sell the derivative for a profit. If widget prices decline, the
derivative product may obligate the trader to buy widgets at a price
higher than the market price, resulting in a loss. Many of the recent
losses related to derivatives are the result of similar speculative
51
activity.
Companies use derivatives to obtain more favorable financing
rates5 2 Derivatives can reduce borrowing costs in two ways. First,
counterparties can take advantage of the different rates at which they
borrow money. For example, a company with a poor credit rating
may be able to obtain lower financing costs by entering into an
interest rate swap with a more highly rated company.53 Second, by

49. Berton, supranote 14,; Hazen, supra note 29, at 1007.
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
51. Derivatives: The Beauty in the Beast, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 21, 21-22.
52. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
53. Suppose Company A wants to borrow at a fixed rate to protect against the possibility
of increasing interest rates. Because of it's poor credit rating, Company A can only borrow at
a fixed rate of 10% and a variable rate of 6%. Company B, a company with a good credit
rating, has obligations that require interest payments at a fixed rate of 8%. If Company B's
income is highly dependent on interest rates, it would like to protect against the possibility that
falling interest rates will make payment of the fixed rate more burdensome. Thus, Company
A and B may wish to enter into an interest rate swap. Company A would save 2% on a fixed
rate obligation, and Company B would no longer be locked into fixed payments. The difference
in interest rates among companies and markets provide opportunities for both parties to benefit
from a swap. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 28-29.
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using derivatives to hedge their market risks, end-users can enhance
54
their credit ratings and receive more favorable financing terms.
III. REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES
A. Various Guidelines and Proposals Advanced by International
Groups
Due to the interconnectedness of derivatives transactions,
regulation of derivatives must be viewed from a worldwide perspective. Without agreement on basic regulatory approaches, attempts at
regulation only serve to chase derivatives transactions to different
locales.55 The serious worldwide implications of derivative losses56
have prompted various national agencies, international groups, and
trade associations to advance guidelines or sponsor proposals related
to derivatives risk control and regulation.57
While most proposals focus their comments toward firms' internal
activities,58 a few groups did give recommendations for regulators.
These recommendations center on establishing new accounting
standards, requiring adequate capital levels, encouraging international
regulatory cooperation, and reviewing firms' internal risk control
mechanisms.
A report issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office recommended updating accounting standards to better reflect derivative
exposure. 59 These improved standards would require a more
54. For example, Moody's and Standard and Poor's, which provide credit risk ratings for
corporate bonds, find derivatives to be a source of income stability for commercial banks.
Abken, supra note 14, at 5; See also GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
55. See infra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
56. Because only a few major OTC derivatives dealers account for a large portion of trading
in world markets, the abrupt failure from one of these dealers could "undermine stability in
several markets simultaneously, which could lead to a chain of market withdrawals, possible firm
failures, and a systemic crisis." GAO REPORT, supranote 6, at 12.
57. Groups that have spoken on the regulation of derivatives include the Basle Committee
on Banking Supervision, the Group of Thirty, the U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs Minority Staff, the SEC, the CFI'C, the U.K's Securities and Investment
Board, and the U.S. General Accounting Office.
58. The recommendations directed at firms included increasing managerial oversight,
devoting adequate risk-control resources, and adopting clear policies for monitoring, reporting,
and controlling derivatives risks. See eg., BASLE COMMITE, supra note 29, 85,559. The
focus on firms rather than on regulators suggests that internal monitoring may play a more
significant role in controlling the dangers of derivatives than regulatory measures. See Nicholas
Bray, Basel Banking PanelConsiders Using Traders' Risk Models for Derivatives, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 1994, § A, at 5D.
59. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
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accurate evaluation of derivative risks and allow investors, regulators,
and market analysts to better assess a company's use of derivatives.
Some commentators feel that capital adequacy requirements
would help control the risks associated with derivatives.' ° The
difficulty, however, is determining what those requirements should be.
The firms that participate in the derivatives market are very diverse.
Rigid standards would61 be overly burdensome for some firms, yet
insufficient for others.
Various groups emphasize the need for international cooperation
if the regulation of OTC derivatives is to be effective.62 If one
country's regulation is especially onerous, the locus of derivatives
transactions will simply move to countries with less stringent
requirements. The systemic risk to the financial system will have
been shifted, but not reduced, and regulating countries will be put at
a competitive disadvantage.
Other commentators, including Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Alan Greenspan, suggest that regulators should assess a firm's level
of compliance according to the effectiveness of their risk-control
system. s Because firms have the most sophisticated risk management systems, it is not imprudent to rely on these internal controls to
protect against derivatives' risks.
B. Current Regulation of U.S. OTC Derivatives Markets
An examination of the current U.S. regulation of OTC derivatives provides a relevant model for the discussion of how derivatives
should be regulated internationally. In the United States, OTC
derivatives may be regulated through two avenues. First, the
instrument itself may be regulated. Instruments are normally
60. The Comptroller of the Currency and other federal financial regulators advocate the
expansion of capital-adequacy requirements to deal with the risks associated with derivatives.
U.S. Plans ChangesIn Capital-RiskRules Related to Derivatives,WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at
A2.
61. See Abken, supra note 14, at 19.
62. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

and the British Securities and Investment Board agreed to seek common standards for OTC
derivatives and share information about firms using OTC derivatives. See U.S., BritainReach
Accord on Oversight Of OTC Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1994, at C12.
63. See Christi Harlan, Greenspan Suggests Derivatives Require New Kind of Oversight,
WALL ST. J., May 26, 1994, at B4. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions emphasized that regulators must ensure
that banks and securities firms have adequate controls'over the risks inherent in their derivative
trades. Nicholas Bray, Two Agencies Issue Guidelines On Derivatives, WALL ST. J., July 27,
1994, at A6.
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regulated to protect the investing public and to allow the markets to
work in an orderly fashion.' Second, the institution from which the
derivative instrument originates may be regulated. Institutions are
regulated in order to protect the soundness of securities firms and the
financial system.6
1. Instrument-Specific Regulation. The derivative instrument
itself may be regulated according to its particular attributes. The
current U.S. regulations for financial instruments appear to have been
designed to separate all instruments into neatly distinguishable
categories of "securities" and "commodities." Thus, the characterization of a derivatives product as a security or a commodity determines
the applicable regulatory environment.6 Unfortunately, attempting
to determine whether a particular hybrid instrument is governed by
securities laws or commodities laws is like "decid[ing] whether
tetrahedrons belong in square or round holes."'67
Generally speaking, if the derivative is deemed a security, it is
subject to federal regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.68 If the derivative is deemed a commodity,
it is subject to regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) pursuant the Commodities Exchange Act.69 If the
derivative is deemed neither a security nor a commodity, the
instrument is generally not federally regulated."
a. OTC Options. Options on commodity futures and futures
contracts on government securities and stock indices are considered
commodity options, falling under the authority of the CFTC.7 ' The
CFTC has promulgated regulations generally prohibiting over-thecounter commodity option transactions. 72 Options on securities
64. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 85.
65. Id. at 69.
66. Charles E. Dropkin et al., Regulation Concerning Derivatives,An InternationalGuide:
United States, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1992, (Special Supplement), at 38.
67. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 883 F.2d 537,
539 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.),
68. Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 38.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 48.
72. 17 C.F.RL § 32.1 (1994). The CFrC has, however, excepted from its general prohibition,
certain dealer and trade options transacted with commercial commodity end users. 17 C.F.R.
§ 32.4 (1994); Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 48.
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(including common stock, stock indices, and government debt
securities) and options on foreign currency fall under the auspices of
the SEC.73 Options on swaps (swaptions) and options on interest
rate protection agreements (captions and floortions) are generally not
subject to either CFTC or SEC regulation.'
b. OTC Forwards. The Commodities Exchange Act excludes
privately negotiated forward contracts from the jurisdiction of the
CFTCI To clarify the forward/future distinction, the CFrC issued
a statutory interpretation granting a safe harbor for instruments that
are not deemed to be futures. 76 To qualify for the safe harbor, the
instrument: (1) must have individually tailored terms, (2) must not be
subject to exchange-style offset, (3) must not be executed through a
clearing-house or mark-to-market margining system, (4) must be
entered into in conjunction with the parties' line of business, and, (5)
must not be marketed to the general public.7 7 The statutory interpretation stresses that the principal distinguishing characteristic
between a future and a forward is the ability to require physical
delivery of the commodity.78 A court of appeals decision clarified
the statutory interpretation, holding that as long as a contract creates
a binding delivery obligation, a subsequent agreement to settle
outstanding obligations by offset will not prevent the contract from
being deemed a forward.79
Under some circumstances, a securities forward could be
considered a security and be subject to the SEC. However, because
forwards are not publicly offered, they are transactions which are
exempt from the SEC registration requirements. °
OTCSwaps. Swaps are not securities, and the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act are not applicable to them.8
Although swaps are similar to futures in many aspects, the CFTC has
issued a policy statement asserting that most swaps are not appropri.

73. Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 48.
74. Id.
75. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 44.
76. Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188 (1990);
Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 44.
77. 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188; Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 44.
78. 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188, 190-91.
79. Krommenhoek v. A-Mark Precious Metals Inc., 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991).
80. Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 46.
81. Id. at 38.
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ately regulated under the CEA.s This policy statement grants swaps
a safe harbor from CFTC regulation. To qualify for the safe harbor,
the swap must be (1) individually tailored in its material terms, (2)
terminable only with the consent of the counterparty without an
exchange-style offset, (3) unsupported by a clearing organization or
margin system, (4) undertaken in conjunction with each party's line
of business, and (5) not marketed to the general public.'m This safe
harbor is available for all swaps and options on swaps.'
2. Dealer-specificRegulation. Derivatives may also be subject
to federal oversight through the regulation of institutions that act as
dealers. Such institutions include banks, securities firms, investment
banks, and insurance companies."
a. Banks. Federal regulators are responsible for overseeing all
bank activities, including derivatives trading. 6 Banks are the most
strictly regulated of the different categories of derivatives dealers.
The purposes of the federal regulatory agencies may explain the
difference. The SEC and CFTC are primarily focused on protecting
the investing public and maintaining orderly markets.' In contrast,
one of the main purposes of federal banking regulation is to protect
not only the safety and soundness of individual banks, but also the
stability of the entire U.S. financial system."8 Banking regulation,
therefore, puts a great deal of emphasis on the institutions themselves.
Banks with national charters are regulated by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) while banks with state charters
are regulated by the Federal Reserve and by state banking authorities.8 9 In order to monitor banks' risk levels and finanical health in
general, regulators require banks to periodically disclose information
on their operations. As a part of these reporting requirements, banks
must disclose the following information concerning their derivatives
activities: total notional/contract amounts of derivatives contracts,
total aggregated derivatives-related credit exposure, and total

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (1994).
Id. at 30,696-767.
Dropkin et al., supra note 66, at 40.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 69.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 69.
I
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aggregated trading-related earnings from derivatives and other trading
activities. 90
b. Securities Firms,FuturesFirms,and Investment Banks. The
SEC and the CFTC are the only sources of regulation for all nonbank firms that deal in derivatives.9 The SEC and the CFTC are
authorized to regulate the trading of securities and commodities and
only have jurisdiction over firms that trade these specific products.92
Generally, neither agency regulates OTC products (or the dealers of
those products) unless the instruments are traded in an institution that
also trades securities or comodities. 93
The SEC regulates the trading activities of "broker-dealers"-firms that buy and sell securities for themselves and as agents
for their customers. The U.S. securities laws, which grant the SEC its
authority, do not necessarily apply to the entire organizational
structure of a securities firm. Because its jurisdiction relates only to
securities, the SEC does not regulate affiliates of broker-dealers
whose activities are limited to non-securities products. As a result,
many holding companies and other affiliates of securities firms are not
controlled by U.S. securities laws. Most major securities firm
derivatives dealers conduct their OTC derivatives business through
affiliates in order to avoid the regulation of the SEC or CFrC.94
The CFTC regulates the activities of various market participants,
including futures commissions merchants (FCM)-firms that buy and
sell futures contracts as agents for customers. The CFTC requires
that all futures contracts be traded on CFTC designated exchanges.
Under the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 9' the CFTC
granted exemptions to this requirement for certain OTC contracts,
including nonequity swaps, energy-based commodity contracts, and
hybrid contracts (contracts that combine features of futures and
securities). While they must follow some reporting requirements,
OTC derivatives dealers that are affiliates of securities and futures
firms are subject to very little regulation.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 70.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L.No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590.
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IV. THE DEBATE OVER STRICTER REGULATION OF
OTC DERIVATIVES
Like all financial instruments, OTC derivatives have their
dangers. Critics claim that derivatives facilitate highly leveraged
speculation, 96 that senior managers do not understand the derivatives
used by their companies,' that new entrants in the derivatives
market increase derivatives risks,9 and that the interconnectedness
of derivative instruments could increase the risk of a market-wide
financial crisis. 91 But even those most adamant about tightening
derivatives regulation admit that these instruments serve some
important functions in the financial markets, such as managing market
reducing transaction fees," and lowering financing
risks,"ec
1° 2
costs.

A. The Argument for Stricter Regulation
1. Leverage Derivative instruments can give end-users a high
degree of leverage 3 compared to holders of the underlying. °4
This leverage allows end-users to take huge speculative risks using
very little capital."° It is this type of leverage that magnified the
losses of companies like Procter & Gamble and Metallgesellschaft 6
Some commentators worry that this temptation to speculate makes it
far too easy for financial whiz kids to put large sums of money at risk.
96. Loomis, supra note 8, at 41.
97. Id. at 40.
98. Cocheo, supranote 3, at 37.
99. Abken, supra note 14, at 2.
100. See Darby, supra note 8, at 3; Loomis, supranote 8, at 41.
101. See Darby, supra note 8, at 3; Hu, supra note 17, at 1466.
102. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
103. In this context, leverage means "the volatility of the value of the derivative relative to
the underlying asset." Andrew Davidson, Comment The Meaning of 'Derivative' HasBeen Lost
in Controversy, AM. BANKER, July 8, 1994, at 19.
104. See Loomis, supra note 8, at 41; Derivatives: The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 51, at
22. The example in section HA, in which an investor purchases an option to buy a security for
$10 within the next 30 days, illustrates how leverage is gained from a derivative. Assume the
price of the security subsequently increases to $15. If the investor purchased the option for $1,
the $5 gain would represent a 500% increase on the investment. To a person who purchased
a share of stock for $10, however, the $5 gain is only a 50% increase on the investment.
105. For example, the derivatives that hurt Procter & Gamble were such that they magnified
the movements of interest rates by 10 times or more. Berton, supra note 14; Simon, supranote
2, at 26.
106. See Berton, supranote 14.
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It is important, however, to look at the other side of the coin.
Leverage, by itself, is neither good nor bad. It can work for or
against an end-user. The leverage inherent in derivatives is one of the
factors that makes a derivative less expensive to trade than its
underlying. These lower transaction costs make derivatives a favored
method for controlling market risks. In addition, leverage is not
exclusive to derivatives. Other trading activities, such as buying on
margin, allow investors to face the same risks from leverage.
2. Management Personneldo not Understand Their Companies'
Derivatives Activities. There is a great deal of concern that most
directors and officers do not fully understand the derivatives their
companies use."t 7 It is argued that because the senior managers do
not understand the instruments, they do not understand the risks
associated with those instruments. Senior managers are therefore
unable to effectively monitor the risk levels of their companies, the
argument goes.
The lack of knowledge on the part of management personnel
may be somewhat overstated, however. Like people using an
advanced computer system, managers can effectively use and manage
derivatives without completely understanding how they work.
Managers need only know their objectives, how those objectives can
be met through derivatives, and the general risks posed by derivatives.
In the past, management personnel may have been somewhat lacking
in their understanding of derivatives, but the recent losses in
derivatives have prompted investors to scrutinize companies' use of
derivative products. This scrutiny has pressured corporate officers to
increase their oversight of derivatives activities. Future losses in the
derivatives market are more likely the result of poor managerial
oversight rather than any danger inherent to derivatives.
3. New EntrantsIn the Market. There is growing concern that
the new, less experienced players in the derivatives markets may use
derivatives without fully understanding their risks," These new
players are mostly larger regional institutions which have recently
expanded their derivatives activities in order to provide dealer
services to their corporate customers." By becoming dealers, these
107. See Loomis, supra note 8, at 40; Hansell &Muehring, supranote 6, at 50; Cocheo, supra
note 3, at 38.
108. See Cocheo, supra note 3, at 37.
109. Ii
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reckless market players may increase the risk for all derivatives
users."" One commentator summarizes as follows: "In manufacturing, market price is set by the smartest guy with the best, cheapest
productions process ....In securities markets the price is set by the
Consequently, the
dumbest guy with the most money to lose."''
end
up
being the losers in
users
frequently
smaller, less sophisticated
2
derivatives."
Certainly new market participants are less experienced than
veteran derivatives dealers, but credit ratings will also reflect this
inexperience. In the end, the investors will sift the financially sound
dealers from the unsound." Even the most experienced derivatives
dealers were once beginners. Rather than artificially restricting those
who can become derivatives dealers, regulators and legislators should
allow budding companies to be either approved or rejected by market
forces.
4. Systemic Risk The greatest concern about OTC derivatives
products concerns systemic risk-the risk that the failure of one firm
could lead to the failure of many other firms or even the entire
financial system." 4 The fears that derivatives contribute to systemic
risk generally stem from four areas of concern: (1) the size and
complexity of derivative instruments," (2) the concentration of
derivatives instruments among a few large institutions,"6 (3) the
7 and (4) market
transparency of derivatives on balance sheets,"
8
trading"
linkages resulting from derivatives
a. Size and Complexity of Derivative Positions. The sheer size
of the derivatives market is a cause of concern to many."' Some
believe the derivatives market has grown so large that prices are

110. There is "a rapidly growing number of smaller outfits anxious not to miss the boat [on
derivatives], who... attempt to keep up with the play and get their share of the market with
limited regard to the dangers." Hansell & Muehring, supra note 6, at 54.
111. Id. (quoting William Heyman, the SEC's head of market regulation).
112. Hazen, supra note 29, at 1006.
113. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 25, at 5.
114. Abken, supra note 14, at 2; Loomis, supra note 8,at 41; Hansell & Muehring, supra
note 6, at 57.
115. Darby, supra note 8, at 12.
116. Id.; GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
117. Darby, supra note 8, at 13.
118. Id.; GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
119. See Jerry W. Markham, "ConfederateBonds," "GeneralCuster," and the Regulation of
Derivative FinancialInstruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 28, 39 (1994).
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pulled in line with the derivatives rather than the other way

around."2 Understandably, it is difficult for most to comprehend a

market with outstanding positions whose notional amounts take up
fourteen digits.121
It is important to remember, however, that notional amounts,
while relatively easy to measure, are not a good indication of the
actual risks of derivatives.m The notional amount of a derivative
is the face value of the underlying contract upon which a derivative
is based." For example, if parties enter into an interest rate swap
based on principal of $100,000, the notional amount is $100,000 even
though the actual cash flows are much less.124 One commentator
explains notional amounts by comparing derivatives to an insurance
policy.'
Protecting a $100,000 house may cost the homeowner
$500 in premiums each year. The notional amount of the policy
would be $100,000. If one is concerned about the insurance company
going out of business, the notional amount is not a very good measure
of the homeowner risk since a new policy would only cost $500.126
The amount at risk in a derivative, like the replacement cost of the
insurance policy, is only a small portion of the notional amount.
Also, much of the exposure from derivatives is countered by offsetting
derivatives contracts. ,The actual exposure related to derivatives is
between two and six percent of the notional principal amount."

120. Rodney Hobson, Under Attack-FinancialDerivatives-Focus,TIMEs, June 29, 1994,
availablein LEXIS, NEXIS Library, TTIMES File ("Trading in derivatives based on shares is
two and a half times as great as trading in the shares themselves, so share prices are pulled in
line with the derivatives.").
121. The General Accounting Office estimates that the notional or contract amount of
derivatives outstanding at the end of 1992 was at least $12.1 trillion. For those who wish to do
the counting themselves, that is $12,100,000,000,000. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 34.
122. See Loomis, supra note 8, at 42 (referring to notional amount as "the flawed but
standard way by which a derivatives business is measured"); Hansell, supra note 4, at 6
(asserting that notional amounts "vastly overstaten the economic value of derivatives
transactions").
123. Abken, supra note 14, at 3.
124. The cash flows would be the difference between the fixed rate of interest and the
floating rate of interest for $100,000. With the exception of currency swaps, the notional amount
or principal of a derivative is generally not exchanged in the transaction. Cocheo, supra note
3, at 36; Abken, supra note 14, at 3.
125. Hansell, supra note 4, at 6.
126. Id.
127. Id. (estimating actual replacement cost of derivatives between three and six percent);
Cocheo, supranote 3, at 36 (citing Group of Thirty study which pegs replacement value at 2.3%
of total notional principal outstanding); Netzer, supra note 9, (quoting Gay Evans of Banker's
Trust International estimating replacement cost at close to two percent of notional amount).
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Granted, two percent of $12.1 trillion is a significant amount of
money. However, the risks from derivatives are generally far less
than the risks from more traditional lending transactions."2
The complex nature of OTC derivatives is not as large a problem
as some commentators suggest. Derivatives can always be broken
down into the basic components of forwards and options whose net
positions can be hedged at the portfolio level.129 Thus, it can be
said that derivatives do not present new risks to the financial markets.
Instead, they take familiar risks and combine them in new ways.'
b. Concentration of Derivatives Activities. A relatively small
number of derivatives dealers account for a large portion of the OTC
derivatives activity.'
The complex information and risk management systems required to conduct derivatives activities may explain
this concentration. 2 Such a degree of concentration generates fears
that the failure of one of these dealers could lead to instability in
several markets and contribute to a systemic crisis. 3
In response to these concerns, some have noted that derivatives
activity is concentrated in the safest and most stable firms, i.e., those
firms with the highest credit ratings and largest amounts of capital? 4 The concentration of derivatives activity does not necessarily
equate to a concentration of risk since most OTC dealers extensively
hedge their derivatives risks. 35 In addition, none of the world's
largest derivatives dealers is responsible for more than
ten percent of
6
the total notional amount of derivatives activity.1
ac Derivatives Transparency Problems. End-users are not
required to report their derivatives-related hedges or speculative

128. See Saul Hansell, Regulators Mute Their Fears over Derivatives,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28,
1994, at D5.
129. Darby, supranote 8,at 12.
130. Id. at 6.
131. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 36-37.
132. Id. at 37.
133. Id. at 39.
134. Id. at 41; Jeffrey Taylor & Steven Lipin, SEC, Six Finns Work to Set Derivatives Rules,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994, at Cl (citing wall Street executives who claim that the market's
stringent requirements for derivatives subsidiaries to obtain triple-A ratings are a better
incentive than federal regulation).
135. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 41.
136. Id.; see also Darby, supra note 8, at 12 ("Because of the need for the highest credit
standing and expensive talent and capital investment to be effective, the major dealers even in
the United States can be counted on the fingers of two hands.").
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positions in their financial statements. 7 Consequently, it is difficult
for shareholders, regulators, and financial analysts to learn what kind
of derivatives risks a company is facing.'
One commentator
worries that "[t]he greatest risk derivatives bring to the marketplace
is not their complexity or volatility; it's the shadowy way in which
they can be used by companies that would rather not tell the
marketplace the truth about their investment intentions."'3
It is
generally recognized that accounting standards for derivatives have
failed to keep pace with business practices and result in inconsistent
reporting between businesses."' Uniform disclosure principles that
accurately represent the economic realities of derivatives use would
provide investors with better information upon which to base their
investment decisions and consequently increase the efficiency of the
derivatives market.
d. Linkages in the DerivativesMarkets. The growth in derivatives has expanded the financial linkages among financial markets and
participating institutions.' Derivatives allow firms to use products
in one market to hedge risks associated with the firm's participation
in another market.'42 Because derivatives derive their values from
underlying assets, the prices in the stock, futures, and options markets
are related. Disruptions in one of these markets are associated with
disruption in the others.'43 There is concern that this interconnectedness could cause a crisis or instability in one firm or market to spill
over into other firms or markets.'
However, international and inter-market linkages do not
necessarily increase systemic risk. These linkages may, in fact, have
a stabilizing influence. A joint study by the U.S. Federal Reserve
System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Comptroller of
the Currency stated that, "it is unlikely that the underlying markets
would have performed as well as they did in September [during the
1992 European currency crisis] without the existence of related
derivatives markets that enabled currency positions to be managed,
137. DARBY, supranote 8, at 13.
138. Netzer, supra note 9.
139. Michael Schrage, As Derivatives DebaclesAdd Up, It's Time to Ask- Hedge or Risk?,
LA. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at D1, D3.
140. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 38.
144. Cocheo, supra note 3, at 42.
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The linkages
albeit with some difficulty in some instruments."'
associated with derivatives may help reduce financial disruptions by
spreading the disturbance among more firms and markets. 46
e. Liquidity Problems. Because they are hard to value,'4 7
many derivatives are relatively illiquid and difficult to sell when
problems arise.'" The more tailored and long-term the derivative is,
the smaller its secondary market becomes. Some believe the liquidity
problem is circular-it is difficult to liquidate a derivative that cannot
be valued and it is difficult to value a derivative that cannot be
liquidated. 49
In times of financial crisis, liquidity problems may occur with
derivatives, as with any type of financial instrument. However, the
effect derivatives had on the 1992 European currency crisis suggests
that the stabilizing benefits of derivatives outweigh the reduced
liquidity of the derivatives instruments5"
f An Overall Assessment of Systemic Risk Do deriviatives
pose a threat of system-wide economic crisis? On the one hand, since
the financial markets have survived several crisis without collapsing,
derivatives are probably not significantly increasing systemic risk. On
the other hand, since the markets have never seen a system-wide
derivatives crisis, no one really knows how bad such a crisis could
The systemic risk arguments are similar to claims that an
be.'
earthquake will strike in a city that has never recorded an earthquake
before. That there has never been an earthquake before reassures
some, but prompts others to believe that an earthquake is long
overdue.5 2 Most analysts agree that the probability of systemic
meltdown is small but the catastrophic nature of such a failure should
The critical question is whether regulation
prompt concern.'

145. JOINT STUDY, supra note 25, at 18.
146. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 42.

147. Pare, supra note 16, at 112; Taming the Derivatives Beas; supra note 39, at 81-82.
148. Simon, supra note 2, at 26.
149. Taming the Derivatives Beast supra note 39, at 82.
150. See Abken, supra note 14, at 20.
151. Taming the Derivatives Beas4 supra note 39, at 81.
152. Derivatives: The Beauty in the Beast,supranote 51, at 21-22 (explaining that recent huge
losses have not caused a chain reaction, but have persuaded people that such a reaction is only
a matter of time).
153. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 6, at 53; Cocheo, supra note 3, at 42; Karr & Lipin,
supra note 4, at A5.
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should address this small risk at the cost of stifling the substantial
benefits companies gain from the booming derivatives market.'"
The widespread fears that derivatives increase systemic risk are
largely overblown. 5 Systemic risk is the most loosely defined of
the risks posed by OTC derivatives'6 and is not, by itself, a good
justification for broader regulation. 7 Evidence suggests that
derivatives and the risk management tools that accompany them have,
on balance, decreased systemic risk." s Systemic risk arises from the
failure of firms and the fear that other firms will fail as a result. 9
Derivatives reduce these failures and fear of failures by cancelling
some risks and shifting other risks to those better able to manage
them.6 As a result, derivatives act to decrease overall systemic
risk.1

154. See Theobald, supranote 4, at A14.
155. Abken, supra note 14, at 20 (accusing the popular press of overlooking derivatives'
stabilizing influence); Loomis, supra note 8, at 42 (expressing dealers' view that concern over
a financial meltdown is greatly overblown); Hansell, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting William
McDonough, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: "We need to be vigilant
about systemic risk... [b]ut the visions of meltdown are overblown."); Forex PlayersSay Don't
Over Regulate Derivatives, Reuters Newswire, June 6, 1994 (expressing various opinions that
dangers of worldwide destabilization are greatly exaggerated), available in WESTLAW, INTNEWS Database.
156. Hansell, supra note 128, at D5 (quoting Clifford W. Smith Jr., finance professor at the
University of Rochester. "It's hard to get people to get precise about what they mean by
systemic risk. It's clear it's big and sometimes scary, but after that they get fuzzy."); Abken,
supra note 14, at 19 (calling systemic risk "the most ill-defined" risk of derivatives).
157. Abken, supra note 14, at 19, Darby, supra note 8, at 1, 10.
158. The report by the Board of Governors summarizes:
[T]he greater awareness and understanding of risk and the enhanced methods of
managing risks probably have reduced the likelihood of systemic problems, and will
continue to do so over time as industry and supervisory practices advance ... [The
devotion of] substantial resources to the development of more sophisticated risk
management tools and ... increasing use of netting to reduce their credit exposures
... have had favorable spill-over effects on institutions' abilities to manage their total
portfolios, not just their derivative activities.
U.S. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, RESPONSES TO QUESIONS
ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES POSED BY CONGRESSMAN JAMES A. LEACH, COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRs, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Oct. 6,1993),

quoted in DARBY, supra note 8, at 7; see also Derivatives: The Beauty in the Beast, supra note
51, at 24 (asserting that derivatives spread risk and improve the aggregate position of linked
companies); Theobald, supra note 4, at A14 ("Extensive SEC and Federal Reserve studies of
the issue-and research from the academic community-agree that, far from a serious, or even
a significant, threat to the nation's financial system, derivatives have been an important
stabilizing factor.").
159. Darby, supranote 8, at 16.
160. Id. at 16-17.
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B. Arguments Against Additional Regulation
1. Regulation Would Increase TransactionCosts. End-users are
concerned that additional regulation would dampen the risk management benefits provided by derivatives. Although derivatives are not
the only way for a company to hedge its risks, the transaction costs
associated with derivatives are lower than those associated with other
hedging instruments.16' These lower transaction costs have made
derivatives a favored method of controlling market risks 62 and an
increasingly important tool in the financial markets.'6 Derivatives
users worry that tighter regulation would increase their transaction
costs and restrict the most inexpensive and effective method of
controlling market risks.
Stricter regulation would also hamper companies' ability to
reduce financing costs through derivatives transactions. Any new
requirement that makes derivatives more expensive or more cumbersome to trade could make interest-rate swaps prohibitively expensive.
As derivatives become more costly, the cost of hedging business risks
also rises. If it becomes more expensive for companies to hedge their
risks, higher credit rates (and the low financing rates that accompany
them) will be more difficult to obtain.
2. Derivatives are Important to Global Financial Markets. Derivatives play an important role in worldwide financial
markets by "providing end-users with opportunities to better manage
financial risks associated with their business transactions."'1
Proponents of stricter derivatives regulation tend to overlook the idea
that fighter regulation would detract from the benefits derivatives
bring to the global market.

161. Koselka, supra note 45, at 47-48 ("Many business objectives served by derivatives could
be achieved without them-at much higher cost.").
162. Berton, supra note 14 (asserting that derivatives are "the cheapest and most readily
available means at companies' disposal to buffer themselves against shocks in currency values,
commodity prices and interest rates").
163. Abken, supranote 14, at 2 (stressing that OTC derivatives are a "mainstay of financial
risk management" which will continue to grow as financial managers become more familiar with
them); Loomis, supra note 8, at 40 (quoting a Citicorp executive who classified derivatives as
"the basic banking business of the 1990s").
164. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
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3. Derivatives Have the Same Risks as Other FinancialInstruments. The risks associated with derivatives are the same risks
associated with other financial instruments." Companies have been
dealing with market risk, credit risk, operational risk, and legal risk
for decades." Rather than creating new types of risk, derivatives
dissect familiar risks and repackage them. 67 In fact, the risks
associated with some more traditional financial instruments are much
greater than those associated with derivatives.'"
Some large institutions have reported massive derivatives-related
losses recently, but these losses were not caused by anything inherent
to derivative instruments. 69 There is a persuasive argument that
losses such as those from Procter & Gamble, Metallgeseilschaft,
Orange County, and Barings Bank were the result of a more

165. Mark Brickell, vice president of J.P. Morgan & Co., explains that derivatives involve
familiar risks: "Swaps guys may be clever characters, but we haven't been able to invent new
kinds of risk." Hansell & Muehring, supranote 6, at 53; BASLE COMMrrrEE, supranote 29,
85,558 ("Neither derivatives, nor the individual risks inherent in them are, by themselves, new.");
Your FinancialFuture,ECONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 15 ("Most derivatives are no riskier than
other financial assets.").
166. Cocheo, supranote 3, at [45] ("The regulators' report to the Senate Banking Committee
notes that 'in many ways, the risks associated with derivative instruments are the same types of
risks banking institutions face daily in their lending, treasury, and trading functions."'). Some
"traditional" financial products are actually very similar to derivatives products:
[E]ven the most esoteric derivatives involve risks that banks have had to deal with for
years. "When you think about it, any bank that makes a fixed-rate mortgage that can
be prepaid is shorting an option," [Mark Brickell] notes. "Any bank that makes an oilproduction loan is exposed to oil-price risk big time. What we do is create ways to
hedge that exposure."
Hanseil & Muehring, supra note 6, at 53.
167. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 6, at 53 (According to Mark Brickell, "[w]hat swaps
have allowed us to do is tear apart different sorts of risk, isolate them and manage them
independently."); Cocheo, supra note 3, at 37 ("Derivatives merely repackage these risks in
different combinations that, in comparison to traditional bank instruments and products, can be
quite complex."); Koselka, supra note 45, at 48 (quoting Elizabeth Glaeser of Mobil Corp.:
"With the type of portfolio Mobil or other large companies have, the risks exist anyway. Being
a large, sophisticated user of derivatives just manages them better.").
168. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 6, at 51 ("[A] close examination of the derivatives
business shows that, while it is hardly risk-free, it is far less precarious than traditional financial
activities. Lending money to shopping mall developers or trading mortgage-backed bonds-to
take just two examples-are actually more dangerous than dealing in derivatives."); Derivatives
Exposure Limited, Survey Shows, AM. BANKER, Aug. 5, 1994, at 16 (citing survey by
International Swaps and Derivatives Association which concludes that firms' credit exposure
from derivatives is significantly less than credit exposure from other financial activities).
169. Derivatives: The Beauty in the Beast, supra note 51, at 22 ("The problems that have
occurred with derivatives have tended to arise less from anything inherent in the derivatives
themselves and more from basic failures of management.").
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traditional financial malady-poor management.'7 ° It is important
to remember that large companies lose millions of dollars regularly on
marketing mistakes and research and development costs that end up
being useless, or poor product line decisions.' As with any potentially productive tool, derivatives can be dangerous if used unwisely.
But this should not detract from the immense benefits derivatives give
to those who use them wisely.
4. Derivatives are a Zero-Sum Game It is important to note
that for every loser in derivatives there is a winner. If a company
records a loss on a derivative product, there is a counterparty who
comes out ahead. This is so because, unlike traditional equity, debt,
and commodity markets, derivatives markets are a zero-sum
game.' 2 The derivatives losses are quick to make the headlines, but
the derivatives gains are seldom mentioned. 73 A reasonable
analysis of the impact of derivative products must show the derivatives gains next to the losses. Any regulation that seeks to control the
losses will inevitably stifle the gains.
5. Stricter Regulation Could Drive Derivatives Business Offshore. Regulations that are too restrictive will drive OTC derivatives
business offshore. 74 When Japan tried to restrict both listed futures
and OTC derivatives tied to the Tokyo stock exchange, the futures
business moved to Singapore and the OTC business moved to New
Such moves not only decrease the competiYork and London.'

170. Your Financial Future, supra note 165, at 15 (blaming Procter & Gamble's and
Metallgesellschaft's losses on "old-fashioned management mistakes"); Top-down Failure,
PENSIONS & INV., May 2,1994, at 12 (explaining that Procter & Gamble's and other companies'

derivatives losses resulted from poor forecasting and poor management oversight: "The treasury
staffs at these companies would have been wrong regardless, of whether they bet through

derivatives or actual securities or currencies, especially leveraged positions."); Joanne Morrison,
Strategy,Not Derivatives,Caused OrangeCounty Crisis, Groups Say, BOND BuYER, Jan. 5,1995,

at 1 (blaming Orange County's losses on a poor investment strategy rather than derivatives); The
Bank that Disappeared,supra note 1, at 11 (citing Baring's failure to police it's "rogue trader"
as the cause of the bank's massive losses).
171. Theobald, supranote 4, at A14 (asserting that derivatives losses are regrettable, but no
more regrettable than "a major marketing miscue, the expenditure of millions of research and
development dollars on a product that bombed, or a substantial operating blunder").
172. Hazen, supra note 29, at 1006; Loomis, supra note 8, at 43; Davidson, supra note 103,
at 19.
173. Top-down Failure,supra note 170, at 12.

174. Abken, supra note 14, at 19; Darby, supra note 8, at 5; Loomis, supra note 8, at 42;
GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.

175. Darby, supra note 8, at 19; Hansell & Muehring, supranote 6, at 61.
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tiveness of the regulated country's firms, they also leave unchanged
any risk of system-wide failure. 76
6. Companieshave market motivations to control derivatives. A
rather important fact in the derivatives debate is often overlooked: it
is in each firm's own interest not to lose money on derivatives. The
risks associated with derivatives and the recent headlines announcing
derivatives losses have forced dealers to maintain very high credit
ratings in order to attract business. Consequently, the market has
been able to limit derivatives activity to those firms with the least
likelihood of default.
7. Regulators like the status quo. While they would like to see
companies disclose more about their derivatives activities, federal
banking and securities regulators believe the current regulatory
framework is adequate and no new legislation is necessary to control
derivatives.'
C. Recommendations for the Ideal International Regulatory Scheme
The most drastic changes to derivatives regulation should be
directed at the accounting rules concerning derivatives. New
accounting standards should be adopted which will give investors,
market participants, and regulators more reliable information on the
extent to which firms use OTC derivatives and the risks associated
with those instruments. Such standards would allow the market to
better regulate derivatives activities.

176. Robyn Meredith, Regulators Oppose Derivatives Bil4 Saying Oversight Is Already
Adequate, AM. BANKER, July 13, 1994, at 3 (noting that the Comptroller of the Currency,
Eugene A. Ludwig, found that the shifting of the derivatives market offshore "doesn't necessarily reduce the worldwide risk, it just moves it out of the U.S.").
177. Meredith, supra note 176, at 3 (quoting the Comptroller of the Currency who claims
that regulators already have sufficient authority to deal with derivatives and that inflexible
statutory requirements could hurt the regulator's ability to adjust to a dynamic market); James
A. Leach, Laissez Faireon Derivatives,NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Nov. 21,1994, at 4 (lamenting
that regulator's position of no legislation has continued to gain strength); LaWare Reiterates
Stand on Derivatives Rules, supra note 12, at 22 (noting that Federal Reserve Board Governor
John LaWare has consistently come out against new derivatives legislation); Derivatives Do Not
Increase Volatility or PresentMore Risk,Swap DealersSay, BNA's BANKING REPORT, Oct. 31,
1994, at 651 (asserting that regulators have a better understanding of derivatives and are
confident that the current regulatory framework is adequate); Gene Ramos, CongressNot Seen
CurbingDerivatives Via New Laws, REuTERs EUR. Bus. REP., Dec. 9,1994, availablein LEXIS,
Nexis Library, REUEUB File (explaining that federal regulators, along with the financial
industry, believe existing regulation is adequate).
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While fears of systemic risk may convince some of the need for
an immediate regulatory crackdown, a drastic increase in OTC
derivatives regulation is not a prudent course of action at present.
Because derivatives may actually decrease systemic risk, sudden
regulatory changes could make matters worse. Instead, derivatives
dealers and regulators should jointly formulate standards of good
business practices in the derivatives industry."' Although such selfregulation will not force dealers to comply with these standards, endusers will be reluctant to arrange derivatives transactions through
dealers who do not follow good industry practices. The recent reports
of the riskiness and dangers associated with derivatives will convince
end-users to seek out the most solid, reliable firms to act as dealers.
If regulatory agencies feel that derivatives dealers' behavior
under this self-regulation is inappropriate, the agencies can inform the
firm, and the investing public, that things need to improve. The
derivatives industry, even more than other financial products
industries, is so highly dependent on client confidence that such a
warning from regulators can be a powerful enforcement tool." 9 In
addition, derivatives dealers should be informed that if self-regulation
does not work, stiff new regulations will be the next step. The threat
of additional regulation will be another powerful reason for derivatives dealers to keep their derivatives under control. If self regulation, regulatory warnings, and threats of regulation are not effective,
regulators are in no worse a position to formulate mandatory
standards than they were before implementing the self-regulation.
What of the massive losses of entities like Procter & Gamble,
Metallgesellschaft, Orange County, and Barings Bank? It is arguable
that the highly publicized losses from derivatives have resulted not
from any inherent danger associated with OTC derivatives, but with
poor management practices. The risks associated with derivatives are
no different from those encountered in the underlying securities, rates,
or indices. In fact, most firms that deal in derivatives have much
higher credit risks from more conventional financial instruments.' 80

178. Thomas A. Russo, Let Wall St Handle Derivatives Rules, N.Y. Trm, May 15,1994,
§ 3, at 13.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, OTC derivative instruments are not as
spooky as they may first appear. Derivatives pose the same risks that
are associated with more common financial instruments, and
derivatives activities are far less perilous than many traditional
financial activities. The thought of a system-wide financial failure is
frightening, but no one really knows how realistic systemic risk is or
what part OTC derivatives might play in such risk. The benefits of
derivative instruments, on the other hand, are much more identifiable.
Derivatives are an inexpensive way for companies to decrease
transaction costs, manage market risks, increase returns, and decrease
financing costs. In fact, some evidence suggests that derivatives have
stabilized financial markets in the past and may serve to decrease
systemic risk in the future. These benefits make derivative instruments important tools in the global financial markets.
Current accounting standards need to be revised to more
accurately reflect firms' involvement with derivative instruments. But
no additional regulation is appropriate at this time. Instead,
regulators and derivatives dealers should jointly set good business
practices to be followed in the derivatives industry. This solution
recognizes that derivatives dealers have enormous market motivations
to control their derivatives risks and that regulators feel the present
regulation of derivatives is sufficient. Self regulation, along with
warnings from regulatory agencies and possible threats of stricter
regulation, should be adequate to control derivatives markets. If self
regulation fails, regulators are still free to formulate additional
derivatives regulation with the added benefit of better information on
the correlation between derivatives and systemic risks.
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